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WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

ANTITRUST LAW-MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY- APPLICATION OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE TO
MUNICIPALITIES-City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. 1 the United States Supreme Court decided an
issue which had divided lower courts: 2 whether the Parker v.
Brown 3 doctrine which exempts state action from the antitrust
laws applies to municipalities engaging in conduct violative of the
antitrust laws. Two Louisiana cities, Lafayette and Placquemine ,
operated an electric system and contracted to provide customers
with water and gas only on the condition that they purchase
electricity from the cities, or at least not from any other supplier.
The action arose when the cities filed an antitrust action against
several competing privately owned electric utilities, one of which
was the Louisiana Power & Light Co. The cities claimed that the
utilities had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.~ Power
& Light counterclaimed, 5 charging the cities with violations of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act. 6
1. 435 u.s. 389 (1978).
2. Tchorni, Antitrust Laws and lHunicipal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt from Sherman Act Under the Parker Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547, 1549 (1977). See,
e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975) (boycott of plaintiffs
beverages in municipal facilities not protected under Parker since the activities not compelled by state as sovereign); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir.
1975) (rate-setting activities by local government immune from antitrust attack when
state expressly delegated to municipality authority to set rates).
3. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker the Court held that the antitrust laws did not apply
to anticompetitive activity undertaken by a state acting in its sovereign capacity. The
court found that "[t]he state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no
contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish
monopoly, but as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government . . . ."!d. at
352 (footnotes omitted).
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful "[e]very contract, combination
. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C.
§ ! (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
5. City of LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 432-33 (5th Cir.
1976). Power & Light alleged that the cities were engaged in sham litigation to delay the
construction of the power plant, that the cities' debentures contained anticompetitive
convenants, and that the cities had conspired with other parties to provide power to
certain areas beyond the time permitted by state law. Because public officials administered the program pursuant to legislative command, the court held that the antitrust laws
did not apply to their conduct. The court found evidence of such a command in the fact
that the state itself exercised its legislative authority in making the regulation and in
prescribing the conditions of the application. Id. at 433-35.
6. Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes it unlawful "for any person engaged in com·
merce . . . to make a sale or contract for sale . . . on the condition that the purchaser
thereof shall not use . . . the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or
seller. . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana held that the cities' status as governmental entities
entitled them to a per se exemption 7 which rendered the municipalities' anticompetitive conduct immune from the operation of
the Sherman Act. 8 Consequently, the court granted the cities'
motion to dismiss Power & Light's counterclaim. 9 Nevertheless,
the court expressed its reluctance to find an exemption for what
was clearly "business activity." 10
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the cities' status as
cities was sufficient to render all their conduct automatically
immune from the Sherman Act under the state action exemption.11 Adopting a form of state legislative intent test for the scope
of the exemption for municipalities, 12 the court remanded the
case for a determination of "whether the activities alleged fell
within the scope of the powers granted the cities by the legislature."13
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 14 to determine
whether the state action exemption should be extended to municipalities. Justice Brennan, speaking for a plurality of four,l 5 nar7. Lafayette, 532 F.2d at 433. In part, the Lafayette court based its holding that the
municipalities were not automatically entitled to immunity on a recent case, Duke & Co.,
Inc. v. Foerester, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975). In Duke the plaintiff, a manufacturer,
brought an action against several private and municipal corporations for conspiracy in
restraint of trade because of a boycott of plaintiffs beverages at various municipal facilities. The trial court held that the cities' status was sufficient to render them immune. On
appeal, the court reversed, thereby implying that municipal corporations do not enjoy a
per se exemption.
8. 532 F .2d at 433.
9. ld. In granting the motion to dismiss the counterclaim the court effectively rejected the claim under the Clayton Act.
10. ld.
11. ld. at 436.
12. I d. at 435-36. Although the court clearly held that in order for a municipality to
claim immunity under the antitrust laws the legislature must have intended that the
engage in the disputed anticompetitive activity, it is unclear how specific
.. articulation of intent must be. The court confused the issue by employing a variety of
to describe articulation which would suffice. At one point, for example, the court
.•uu""<1ct:u that the anticompetitive activity had to be "comprehended" by the legislature.
·'fd. at 434, 436. At another point, the court predicated immunity on a finding that the
challenged activity came "within the legislative intent." ld. at 434. The court also augthat the activity would be exempt if "contemplated" by the legislature. [d. These
are unsatisfactory since they do not enumerate explicit criteria to be used in deterhow specific the articulation must be; they merely assert that articulation must
See also text accompanying notes 70-95 infra (legislative intent test discussed).
13. 532 F.2d at 436.
14. 430 u.s. 944 (1977).
15. Justice Marshall, Justice Powell and Justice Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's
Chief Justice Burger also joined in Part I of Justice Brennan's opinion. Part I
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rowly construed the scope of the exemption. The plurality was
chiefly concerned with upholding the antitrust laws and did not
think that an exemption for anticompetitive conduct of municipalities should be widely available. As part of its narrow reading
of the state action doctrine the plurality indicated that it would
not lightly imply exclusions from the antitrust laws. 16 Justice
Brennan stated that there were only two policies which courts li.ad
held were sufficiently important to overcome the presumption
against implied exclusions from the antitrust laws: first, the protection of "open communication between the policy and its lawmakers, " 17 and second, the protection of the sovereignty of the
states. 18 He concluded that subjecting the municipality to liability would not undermine either of those policies and so refused
to imply an exclusion, 19
Like the court of appeals, the plurality adopted a test for
determining the immunity issue which turned on an assessment
dealt with the cities' secondary argument that Congress never intended to subject local
govemments to the antitrust laws. 435 U.S. at 394-408. The main issue of contention
between the parties, which is the focus of this note, was the intended scope of the Sherman
Act vis-~-vis local political subdh~'i8iD:£1£ (mtP:~i-cipaJ!tiP-s) given its scope vis-~-vis states.
16. Thus, the Court considered all of the arguments advanced by the petitioner
cities "in light of the presumption against implied exclusions from coverage under the
antitrust laws." I d. at 398.
17. As an example the Court cited Eastern R.R Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), in which it held that 11 conceited effort by persons
to influence lawmakers to enact anticompetitive legislation beneficial to themselves or
detrimental to competitors was protected from an antitrust challenge. I d. at 139. See also
United Iviine Wo;·kers of A;nerica v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 119651.
18. The Court furthel' said that" 'an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.'" 435 U.S. at. 400
(quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
19. 435 U.S. at 408. The plurality limited the avaiiability of a state action exemption
to municipalities in another way. It held that the definition of "persons" in § 7 of the
Sherman Act included cities not only when suing as plaintiffs but also when sued as
defendants in antiti'ust cases. lil dving s;:; the Court. ;extended the holdings of both Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlantu, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) and Georgia v. Evans.
316 U.S. 159 {1942), which defined "person" in the antitrust statutes to include cities
suing as plaintiffs. The Court added that it would construe the antitrust laws to be
inapplicable to cities only if there was some overriding policy which would precluJe subjecting them to antitrust liability. 435 U.S. at 397.
Since the cities then.1selves did r1ot e,rgu~ that. they were not ;'persons" within the
meaning of the antitrust laws, id. at 395, the Court's decision to consider the issue underscores its disposition to limit the availability of an immunity to cities. Further evidence
of this disposition can be seen in the Court's rejection of the cities' argument that it would
be anomalous to subject them to the same kinds of civil and criminal liabilities imposed
on private parties. Since the counterclaim against the cities would render them subject
to $1.5 billion in treble damages, 532 F.2d at 431, the cities' argument seems a plausible
one. The plurality's refusal to consider the merits of this argument reflects its reluctance
to analyze fully differences between municipal corporations and private parties which
might dictate a different test.

f
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of legislative intent. The principal question was whether the legislature had intended to exempt the disputed activity from the
operation of the antitrust laws. 20 The plurality required some affirmative articulation that the state intended to replace a scheme
of enforced competition with an alternative regulatory scheme. 21
To be able to claim the exemption successfully, the plurality
demanded that the legislature "contemplated the kind of action
complained of. " 22
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment of the
Court. 23 He thought that the issue of a municipality's exemption
be determined on a case-by-case assessment of the type of municipal regulation involved. 24 Specifically, he would have asked
whether the municipality was engaged in commercial or governmental activities. Since he concluded that the cities were involved in commercial activities, he agreed with the plurality that
the cities were not immune from the antitrust laws. 25
Justice Stewart, joined by two other Justices in dissent, 26
20. See notes 4-5 supra and text accompanying notes 76-89 infra.
21. There are several reasons why a court may require such an affirmative articulation: first, that a state regulatory pricing is truly at stake; second, that it guarantees that
anticompetitive behavior will be subjected to some regulation and will not be merely
uncontrolled; and finally, that it helps to ensure account will be taken of federal interests
in antitrust enforcement. For a more detailed discussion of these reasons, see text accom- panying notes 77-83 infra.
22. 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting City of Layfayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532
F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976)). It was not, however, entirely clear how specific the articulation had to be. See generally notes 12-13 supra (court of appeals formulation of specificity
discussed).
Another unanswered issue was whether a city could claim the exemption where it was
merely authorized to engage in anticompetitive activity or whether it had to actually be
compelled or directed to do so as a precondition to the immunity. See Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), in which the court had held that only conduct compelled
by the sovereign is exempt; conduct merely prompted by the state is not adequate. !d. at
It is possible that in adopting the test based on legislative intent, the plurality sought
modify the Goldfarb test. Chief Justice Burger, however, interpreted the plurality
ion as adhering to the Goldfarb test as a threshold inquiry in determining whether
anticompetitive activity is the kind proscribed by the Sherman Act. Lafayette, 435
.S. at 425 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also text accompanying notes 96-107 infra.
23. 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
24. Chief Justice Burger said: "This case turns, or ought to, on the District Court's
conclusion, unchallenged here, that 'these plaintiff cities are engaging in what is
a business activity; activity in which a profit is realized.'" !d. (Burger, C.J.,
25. Id. (Burger, C.J ., concurring).
26. Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stewart's opinion. JusBiackmun, however, did not agree with Part B of Justice Stewart's opinion. Part B
d the result reached in Lafayette on the ground that it would "cause excessive
interference not only with the procedures by which a State makes its governmenuec:tst(Jns, but with their substance as well." I d. at 438 (Stewart, J ., dissenting). Justice
specifically noted that he did not interpret Justice Stewart's dissent as reaching
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disagreed sharply with the narrow reading of the state action
doctrine adopted by the plurality and implied that some exemption for municipalities should be availableY The plurality's legislative intent test, the dissent asserted, would defeat the availability of an exemption in most cases. It would be available only in
those limited instances involving acts by the state legislature to
validate specifically the anticompetitive actions of the municipality. 28 The dissent's broader reading of the state action doctrine
led it to adopt a per se test based on the governmental status of
the municipality. 29 Since the key distinction to be drawn under
the dissent's view is between governmental and private conduct,"u
and a city's conduct is governmental, 31 cities persumably would
always be able to claim an exemption.
This note will first examine the origin of the state action
doctrine in Parker u. Brown. 32 Since neither the specific holding
of Parker nor the Parker Court's analysis of the legislative history
of the Sherman Act provide an answer to the appropriateness of
an exemption for a municipality's conduct, the note will conclude
that it is necessary to examine the policies implicit in the state
action exemption. An analysis of the policy tensions implicit in
Parker, coupled with a realization that municipalities and states
the issue of whether the cities would be immune under the Sherman Act if "found to be
acting in concert with private parties." He concluded that to grant an immunity in such
a case would "go beyond the protections previously accorded officials of the States themselves." ld. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27. Justice Stewart criticized the plurality's narrow reading of Parker, stating that
"instead of applying the Parker doctrine, the Court today imposed new and unjustifiable
limits upon it." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426-27 (Stewart, J ., dissenting).
28. "By this exclusive focus on a legislative mandate the plurality has effectively
limited the governmental action immunity of the Parker case to the acts of a state legislature." 435 U.S. at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart disagreed with what he
regarded as an unjustifiably narrow reading of Parker on policy grounds. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra (discussing the reasons a municipality might be entitled to an
excemtion under Parker). Further, he thought this narrow reading conflicted with the
court's opinions in prior cases. 435 U.S. at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
29. For a discussion of the importance of status as a factor in the dissent's decision
on the availability of an immunity from the antitrust laws, see text accompanying notes
108-17, 127-28 infra.
30. The importance which the dissent attached to this distintion is rel1ected in its
criticism that "[t]he fundamental error in the opinions of the plurality and of the Chief
Justice is their failure to recognize the difference between private activities authorized by
the government on the one hand, and the actions of the government itself on the other."
435 U.S. at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. "There can be no doubt on which side of this line the petitioners' actions fall.
'Municipal corporations are instrumentalities of the state for the convenient administration of government within their limits.'" Id. at 429 (citing Louisiana v. Mayor of New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287 (1883)).
32. 317 u.s. 341 (1943).
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share many relevant characteristics, 33 suggest that a per se a pproach to the applicability of the state action exemption to municipalities is unsatisfactory. This note will then examine the
doctrinal tests available to the Court in Lafayette and conclude
that none of these tests alone is sufficient to resolve the municipality issue. Instead a case-by-case balancing test, which looks to
the underlying policies 34 behind the state action exemption and
the nature ofthe municipality's conduct, 35 should be adopted to
determine the scope of the exemption for municipalities.
I.

INAPPLICABILITY OF A PER SE APPROACH TO THE STATE AcTION
EXEMPTION IN THE MUNICIPAL CONTEXT

A.

Development of the State Action Exemption
in the State Context

The doctrine exempting state regulation from the scope of
the antitrust laws was firmly established in Parker u. Brown. 36
33.

For a comparison of cities and municipalities, see text accompanying notes 55-

Courts have often looked to underlying policies in reaching a decision on the
availability of an exemption from the antitrust laws. The Parker Court's consideration of
values of federalism clearly influenced its decision to uphold the state regulation. See text
accompanying notes 50-54 infra. For other instances in which the Court looked to policies,
. see notes 84-85 and text accompanying notes 112-20 infra.
35. This focus on the nature of the challenged activity is an approach endorsed by
Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Lafayette. 435 U.S. at 420 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). He first espoused such a test in his concurrence in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), stating that "in interpreting Parker, the Court has heretofore
on the challenged activity, not upon the identity of the parties to the suit." !d. at
, C.J., concurring). For a discussion of the need for and the advantages of a
test, see text accompanying note 129 infra.
317 U.S. 341 (1943). Courts had dealt with the question of the applicability of
federal antitrust laws to state action before Parker, however. See Olsen v. Smith, 195
332 (1904); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (D.S.C. 1895). In Olsen several licensed
of the port of Galveston sued the defendant for damages for offering his services as
without a license. They also sought an injunction against further violations. In his
the defendant challenged the state licensing laws on several grounds, including
violation of the antitrust laws. He based his challenge on the ground that the
had violated the Sherman Act by suppressing the trade of nonlicensed pilots.
Court refused to entertain that defense and held that there was no antitrust violation
the alleged conduct was undertaken pursuant to a state regulatory statute. The
stated: "No monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that
authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving upon·
by law." ld. at 345.
In Lowenstein, a North Carolina liquor merchant tested the validity of a South
na statute establishing a state liquor monopoly under the newly enacted Sherman
When South Carolina seized a barrel of whiskey he had shipped across the border,
that the statute violated the antitrust laws. The court dismissed the suit on
ground that, because the state was not a person within the meaning of the Sherman
the court lacked jurisdiction. See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review,
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Handler, Antitrust Review).
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The Court held in Parker that the antitrust laws did not apply
to anticompetitive state regulation so long as the state exercises
legislative authority in making the regulation and supervises its
application. 37
In Parker a private raisin producer sought to enjoin the California Director of Agriculture from enforcing the state's Agricultural Marketing Act. 38 The producer attacked the program provided for in the Act on the ground that it violated the antitrust
laws. 39 The program was an anticompetitive scheme designed to
cure the persistent problem of overproduction and the harmful
effects of oversupply in the raisin industry 40 through the maintenance of prices and the restriction of competition. 4 '
To effectuate its stated goals, the Act authorized a scheme
involving both private producers and public officials. 42 The Court
scrutinized the scheme to determine how substantial the state's
involvement was and found it significant. The state was involved
in creating the machinery for establishing the program; moreover,
the programs could not become effective without the approval of
37. 341 U.S. at 352. For a discussion of the substantiality of the state's involvement
in the scheme, see note 42 infra.
38. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stats. 1969, as amended by chs. 471, 743,
1935 Cal. Stats. 1530, 2088; ch. 6, 1938 Cal. Stats. 2485; ch. 1150, 1186, 1941 Cal. Stats.
1186, 2943, now CAL. AGRIC. ConE §§ 59501-59694 (1973), cited in Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71, 81
(1974}.
39. Parker, 317 U.S. at 348-49.
40. The oversupply of raisins had been a persistent problem since 1920 and the
carryover in record raisins was estimated at 30-50% of each year's annual crop. !d. at 364.
On the basis of this fact, one student commentator has attempted to limit the scope of
the state action doctrin~ of Parker to situations in which unfettered competition produces
undesirable results. That view has not gained general acceptance. See Note, Parker v.
Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164, 1173 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note,
A Preemption Analysis].
41. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346. Given the declared purposes of the Act, it is not surprising that at hearings before the advisory commission, see note 42 infra, private producers
carried the burden of showing that the institution of the program is a designated zone
would in fact "prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products" and
"conserve the agricultural wealth of the State." !d. at 346. See Slater, supra note 38, at
81 n.51.
42. The Act provided for the appointment of an advisory commission whose members were appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. The state agriculture director served as an ex-officio member. At the same time private producers were
involved in several stages of the scheme. They could petition the commission for the
establishment of a marketing program in a designated area. If the commission then concluded the need existed for such a program based on prescribed economic findings, it
would appoint program committees consisting of private producers to draw up proration
programs. The commission could hold public hearings on and suggest modifications of
proposed programs. If approved by the commission the program would be submitted to a
referendum of private producers. If 65% of such producers, controlling acreage of at least
51% approved, the commissioner would declare the program effective. 317 U.S. at 346-47.
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public officials.H Finding that the involvement of the state was
sufficient to render the action "state action," the Parker Court
concluded that such action did not fall within the scope of the
Sherman Act 44 and was, therefore, exempt.
1.

PARKER'S RELIANCE ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Court based its conclusion on the interpretation of congressional intent and legislative history of the Sherman Act. ~ 5 The
Court relied on two key factors in its analysis. The first was a
statement by Senator Sherman, a sponsor, that the Act was intended to prevent "business combinations. " 4fl From that statement the Court drew the negative inference that the bill was
designed to reach only monopolistic practices undertaken by such
combinations and, by implication, not any other anticompetitive
conduct. The other factor was the absence of any explicit mention
of state activity in the ActY From this the Court inferred an
intent to exclude states from coverage.
This legislative history does not convincingly lead to a conclusion that Congress intended state activity to be exempt from
the Sherman Act. 48 Neither the absence of explicit mention of
state activity nor the statement of an interested sponsor are particularly reliable indicia of legislative intent. Because the evi!d. at 350.
!d. at 350-51. See Note, A Preemption Analysis, supra note 40, at 1173: "The
traditional interpretation of Parker is framed in jurisdictional terms. Under this approach
Parker is read to hold, as a matter of statutory construction, that a state and its officials
· not within the intended reach of the Sherman Act."
45. The Court stated: "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in
history which suggests its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers from activities
directed by its legislature." 317 U.S. at 350-51.
46. "The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act
that it prevented only 'business combinations.' 21 CONG. REc. 2562,2457 . . . . "
at 351. Slater has criticized this interpretation. He asserts that the quotation relied
was taken out of context. Slater contends that when the remark is placed in context
that the sponsor "was distinguishing associations which carry on lobbying and
relations activities from those which actually make sales contracts and reach
'"'"""m''"" as to the manner of carrying on commerce." He concludes that the prorate
at issue in Parker would clearly constitute a business activity prohibited by the
Act. Slater, supra note 38, at 83. Slater's remarks are important primarily as
indication that the legislative history was not wholly conclusive on the exemption
43.
44.

The Court said: "The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and
no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
." 317 U.S. at 351.
48. As Slater points out, "[T]he real problem with trying to use legislative history
resolve the issue posed in Parker is that Congress probably never actually considered
state action was to be included within the coverage of the act." Slater, supra note
, at 84.
47.
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dence of legislative intent regarding a state action exemption was
almost non-existent, it seems reasonable to conclude that the real
basis for the finding of a state action exemption lay not in the
scant legislative intent, which at best showed that Congress had
not explicitly excluded the states within the coverage of the Sherman Act, but instead in the policies inherent in such a finding.4u
2.

POLICIES INHERENT IN THE PARKER DECISION

A basic policy tension is involved in any state action exemption determination like the one made in Parker. A narrow reading
of the exemption is supported by the desire to ensure adequate
enforcement of the antitrust laws in order to protect the competitive system. 50 This policy conflicts with two policies which support the exemption. The first of these is a desire to protect federalism values by deferring to a local interest in regulation. Application of this policy requires a court to make a value judgment
that striking down the regulation would unjustifiably intrude on
local sovereignty. 51 The other policy concern weighed against the
national interest in antitrust enforcement is a desire to protect
the not-for-profit regulatmy objectives of governmental entities.
That policy concern was implicitly reflected in the Court's distinction between public and private action and in its characertization of the disputed conduct as an act of government. 52 From
49. Some courts and commentators have reached the same conclusion. See Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia
Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1136 (5th Cir. 1971); Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker
v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 17 (1976); Handler, Antitrust
Review, supra note 36, at 18; Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, A.B.A.
SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 313 (1961); Slater supra note 38, at 86, 90; Tchorni, supra note
2, at 1556.
50. Implicit in the policy is the value judgment that the best way to ensure adequate
economic performance is through competition. A. KAHN, THE EcoNOMICS OF REGULATION,
1, 3 (1970). This assumption, however, has been questioned. See, e.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE
NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 919 (1976) (questioning the traditional view of justifying the antitrust laws by allocation theory).
51. See Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1555: "The Court's holding in Parker-that. Congress did not intend the Sherman Act. to reach state action-exemplifies a judicial reluctance to make inroads on state sovereignty."
52. Parker, 317 U.S. at 35~. In addition, Slater has found some direct support for
the importance of a proprietary/regulatory distinction in the opinion.
In Parker itself there is ~orne indication that when the state acts in a private or
proprietary capacity it will be treated differently from when it acts in a governmental
or regulatory capacity. Again, the point is not directly confronted, but Chief Justice
Stone intimated that the case might be decided differently if there were a "question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement
or combination by others for restraint of trade."
Slater, supra note 38, at 90 (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52). See also text accompanying
note 130-44 infra (regulatory/proprietary distinction discussed).
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that distinction one can infer that the Court would more readily
imply an exemption from the antitrust laws when the action is
governmental, and therefore presumably without a profit motive,
than when the actor is a private party interested in maximizing
profits. 53
To resolve the immunity question in Parker, the Court
weighed the state interests in regulation against the competing
. interest in antitrust concerns, and concluded that federalism values and the absence of a profit motive in governmental regulation
were sufficiently important to warrant an exemption. 54 The
Parker holding thus indicates that certain policies which state
regulation embodies may outweigh the desire for a competitive
system and justify the grant of an exemption from the antitrust
laws.
B.

Applicability of the State Action Exemption to a
Municipality

Under the state action exemption laid down in Parker, a
state's desire to suspend enforcement of the antitrust laws is sufficient to create an exemption. 55 Thus, under the fact situation in
Lafayette, it seems clear that had the state, and not the municipality, undertaken .to implement the program, the same scheme
would have been found exempt from the antitrust laws. The question in Lafayette therefore becomes to what extent cities should
be accorded the same treatment as states for purposes of making
53. Implicit in the Parker Court's assessment of the governmental or private status
of the regulators may also be the underlying tension between federalism and antitrust
values. A court may be unwilling to imply an exemption for a private party since it falls
outside the scope of federalism concerns. However, if a state or local governmental entity
is involved, federalism concerns are present and the court may wish to grant immunity
to preserve the balance between local and national spheres of authority, even at the
expense of antitrust enforcement. See note 2 supra and the cases cited therein. See also
New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
For a discussion of the importance of this difference between the government as a
proprietor and the government as a regulator in the determination of an antitrust exemption, see text accompanying notes 130-44 infra.
54. It should be pointed out that although the state agricultural marketing scheme
was inconsistent with the antitrust la_ws, it was nevertheless consistent with the Federal
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, Act of June 3, 1937, ch. 296, §§ 1·2, 50 Stat. 246
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-664 (1976)). Thus, Parker could be interpreted as
exempting state action from the antitrust laws only to the extent it is consistent with a
similar scheme of federal policy. One court has held that this is an inherent limitation of
Parker. See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also
Handler, Antitrust Review, supra note 36, at 15. Most courts, however, have not attempted to limit the scope of the Parker doctrine in this way. But see Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 409. n.39 ("[t]he State regulatory program involved in Parker . .. was consistent with
federal policy").
55. See generally L. SuLLIVAN, THE LAw OF ANTITRUST 739 (1977).
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the state action exemption determination. Since cities and states
share many characteristics, it is arguable that courts should accord to the cities' interests in regulation the same deference accorded to the states' interests. Because cities differ from states,
however, an exemption for cities equivalent to that afforded to
st~te action may not be warranted. Cities combine characteristics
of' both the public regulator and private profit maker, and thus
it is important to compare cities with states to determine how
courts trying to resolve the policy tensions between federalism
and antitrust law should treat them.
1.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CITIES AND STATES

Cities and states share many of the same relevant characteristics. Like states, cities are an important element in a governmental system which allocates power between local and national
government. 56 The basic policy tension between protecting federalism values and ensuring adequate antitrust enforcement is
present in determining the applicability of a state action exemption to cities. 57 Concerns for efficiency and even necessity have
dictated that the cities assume a wide range of responsibilities."x
Because it is impossible for the state to anticipate fully all potential problems a city might face and because its own resources are
56. As the Court stated in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968):
"[IInstitutions of local government have always been a major aspect of our system, and
their responsible and responsive operation is today of increasing importance to the quality
of life of more and more of our citizens." In spite of the fact that Avery was decided under
the 14th amendment, the Court's statements about the importance of local government
are still relevant to the case at hand, even though it does not involve a 14th amendment
claim. But as the Court pointed out in Lafayette, "Although . . . the actions of a local
government are the actions of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, state
action required under Parker has different attributes." 435 U.S. at 414 n.43.
57. The dissent clearly thought that cities raised federalism concerns. First, the
dissent criticized the opinion as "an extraordinary intrusion into the operation of state
and local government." 435 U.S. at 434. The plurality apparently discounted the federalism aspects of the municipality question on the ground that since municipalities were not.
sovereign for the purposes of the 11th amendment, they "do not receive all the federal
deference of the States that create them." Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
58. The dissent pointed out the primary advantages of delegation of powers to municipal governments. "Such local sell-government serves important 5tate interests. Tt
allows a state legislature to devote more time to statewide problems without being burdened with purely local matters, and allows municipalities to deal quickly and flexibly
with local problems." ld. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting). As the Avery Court explained:
"Legislators enact many laws but do not attempt to reach those countless matters of local
concern necessarily left wholly or partly to those who govern at the local level." 390 U.S.
at 481. It appears that Lafayette, "by demanding extensive [state] legislative control
over municipal action," 435 U.S. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting), will hinder a state's
ability to delegate authority by broad grants and thus may hamper the most efficient
functioning of government.
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limited, a state must, and often does, delegate some powers to
municipalities to legislate for the general welfare. Their importance as a local unit of government responsible for integral functions and essential services suggests that cities should be accorded the same deference as the Court accords states. 5 u
Cities, like states, also act in purely regulatory capacity.
Since the Parker Court granted an e-xemption to a state engaged
in governmental activities-activities which lack a profit motive-it seems appropriate to grant an exemption for purely regulatory conduct. Cities, to the extent they are acting in a purely
regulatory capacity, are acting to protect the public welfare and
are not profit motivated. Thus, the desire to restrain trade and
thereby to increase profits is less present than it is in a purely
private context.
Moreover, cities, like states, are also subject to political controls.60 Because they are accountable to the public, there is argua59. Zoning and licensing are two areas in particular where municipalities have been
accorded autonomy to legislate for the general welfare. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926) (zoning laws proper exercise of police
power); Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915) (burden on party
seeking to invalidate local ordinance prohibiting manufacture of bricks within specified
city limits); Barnes v. Merritt, 428 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum) (presumption
exists that geographical limitation on liquor licensing was enacted with requisite formalities). See Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1559 n.72. The Lafayette decision could limit the
municipalities' ability to provide this essential local regulation.
In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), the city passed a municipal
ordinance the principal purpose of which was to preserve the character of an historic area.
The Court detailed the authority for the city's passage of the regulation as follows:
"pursuant to the Louisiana State Constitution, c. 8 of Art. V of the city's Home Rule
Charter grants the New Orleans City Council power to enact ordinances designed to
preserve [the Vieux Carre's] distinctive charm, character, and economic vitality." ld. at
299. The ordinance at issue prohibited sales by pushcart vendors unless they had been in
Vieux Carre for at least 8 years.
The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the ordinance under an equal protection challenge by an excluded vendor. The Court asserted that the city could reasonably
have concluded that street vendors tended to interfere with the charm of the historic area.
Vieux Carre, the Court said, "is the heart of that city's considerable tourist industry and
an integral component of the city's economy." ld. Further, the Court found that newer
vendors were more likely to interfere with that charm than older vendors who had themselves become part of the charm of the area. Id. at 304-05.
Lafayette, however, mandates a different result. As Justice Stewart pointed out in
the dissent, the pushcart vendor might now bring an action challenging the statute not
on equal protection grounds but on the ground that the statute unreasonably limited the
!lUmber of competitors in the area-and he might prevail. 435 U.S. at 440 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Unless the city could successfully demonstrate that the state legislature had
"contemplated" the exclusion of most pushcart vendors, their regulation would not qualify as valid state action. ld. (Stewart, J., dissenting). This contemplation is unlikely since
zoning decisions are made by municipalities.
60. It is significant that the plurality and the dissent viewed the distinction differently. The dissent regarded the fact that city governments "are subject to direct popular
control through their own electorates and through the state legislature," 435 U.S. at 430
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bly no need for a court to scrutinize their anticompetitive conduct
more than a state's anticompetitive conduct. Presumably, the
public can protect its own interests in competition in the market
by voting against municipal governments which do not protect
public interests. 61
2.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CITIES AND STATES

Although these similarities between cities and states suggest
that extension of the state action docrine is justified, their differences indicate that courts cannot treat cities as equivalents of
states in all instances. 62 The first difference is that cities are far
more numerous than states and therefore, perhaps, have a greater
potential to undermine the effectiveness of the antitrust laws.sJ
Conceivably, municip!llities could enact numerous anticompetitive regulations, each at odds with the antitrust laws. 64 Because
of their variety and quantity, the national government might
have difficulty controlling such regulations. Second, because cities are not in themselves sovereign entities and have no power
(Stewart, J., dissenting), as important in analyzing the immunity issue. The accountability of the municipality to political control underscored an important difference between
municipalities and private combinations of wealth and provided a further reason to construe the state action doctrine broadly to include municipalities. The plurality, on the
other hand, rejected the importance of the political accountability of cities. The plurality
thought that the opportunity for consumers to take their complaints to the legislature was
not a sufficient reason to imply an exemption. It reasoned that the protection afforded
such consumers was fictitious since they did not really "have a meaningful chance of
influencing the state legislature to outlaw on an ad hoc basis whatever anticompetitive
practices petitioners may direct against them from time to time." ld. at 406.
61. Even if swindled consumers at the local level could compel the municipal government to act in their interests, those interests would not necessarily comport with
national antitrust interests. Thus, as the plurality pointed out, it is possible to conceive
of situations where constituents were being protected, but overall regional efficiency was
being impaired. ld. at 406-08. The political redress argument does not take account of the
problem of a possible divergence of local constituent interests and federal antitrust concerns.
62. But see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), in
which the Court delineated some limits on how far a state could go in interfering with the
competitive process. See text accompanying note 72 infra; SULLIVAN, supra note 55, at 73137.
63. The piuraiity noted that "[i]n 1972, there were 62,437 different units of local
government . . . . " 435 U.S. at 407 (citing 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF
GovERNMENTs, GovERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1973)). The plurality's concern that an
increasingly large sector of the economy is becoming exempt from the antitrust laws is
shared by commentators. See Slater, supra note 38, at 74; Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1591
(both noting the increased role of government as a ~onsumer of goods and services). See
also Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970).
64. It is even possible that a municipality may enact an ordinance which contravenes state policy, but which would not be rendered unlawful under state law. 435 U.S. at
414 n.44.

1979:570

Lafayette u. Louisiana Power

583

other than that derived from the state, they are not entitled to
the same deference in the federal scheme. 65 While cities may be
entitled to some deference, the policy favoring the federalist system is less compelling in the municipality context.
This comparison between cities and states suggests that
there is no easy answer which will resolve the question of an
exemption for municipalities. Cities are hybrid units and require
special attention. A case-by-case scrutiny may be necessary to
determine the appropriateness of an exemption. 66 Though states
are often accorded a per se exemption when they are charged with
antitrust violations, the differences between states and cities indicate that cities should not automatically be denied or granted
an exemption.
IT.

DOCTRINAL TESTS FOR ASSESSING ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

To assist in the resolution of the municipality question the
Court had available to it several doctrinal tests which help define
the scope of the state action exemption. 67 These doctrinal tests
65. The difficulty with the plurality's statement that cities are not sovereign and
do not enjoy all the deference accorded states is that it never reached the issue of whether,
since they are local units of government, albeit not sovereign ones, they should be accorded
any deference in the federal system. See note 57 supra. See generally Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 667 n.l2 (1974); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (11th
amendment does not protect counties from suits in federal courts). But see National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
66. The case-by-case approach is one that many courts, concerned about an overex·
tension of the state action doctrine, have begun to use. They have begun to screen claims
of antitrust immunity carefully and to reject any facile conclusions of state action. See,
e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (court interpreting Parker
as placing an inherent limitation on the state action doctrine to regulatory schemes which
comply with a similar scheme of federal regulation).
For another instance in which the court scrutinized public action to determine
whether an exemption should be available, see George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), discussed in note 84 infra. The court said
that the Parker Court's "emphasis on the extent of the state's involvement precludes the
facile conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers exemption." ld.
30. The need for a case-by-case scrutiny in the context of municipalities is particularly
great because there is no clear answer to whether municipalities automatically warrant
an exemption.
67. For interesting discussions of these doctrinal approaches, see Slater, supra note
, 38; Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor,
and Bates, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 898, 909 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Parker
Revisited].
Professor Ronald Kennedy analyzes the state action exemption cases in a slightly
way from the analysis presented here. See Kennedy, Of Lawyers, [,ightbulbs, and
An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U.L.
31 (1979). In his view, state action doctrine consists of "two closely related but
distinct elements, immunity and validity." ld. at 72. As to immunity, Kenstates that the state insofar as it acts in its sovereign capacity is immune from the
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provided a framework for addressing the issue raised in Lafayette.
As will be seen, the tests basically reflect different ways of analyzing the same problem, ways that have been elevated to test status
by courts without sufficient articulation of why the court applies
the particular test in the particular circumstance. Moreover, the
tests, standing alone, have limited usefulness for assessing the
appropriateness of a municipality exemption. They were developed in differing factual contexts either of state action or a mixture of purely private action and state action and do not address
the municipality question directly. 68 The greatest shortcoming of
the tests is that they adopt a fairly narrow mechanical approach
to the state action exemption which is based on a single criterion-either the particularity of the state's delegation, the independence of the decisionmaker, or the status of the antitrust defendant. For that reason, they appear to be too inflexible to adequately resolve the policies of Parker in the municipality context.69
A.

Legislative Intent Test

A court employing a legislative intent test focuses on the acts
of the state legislature to determine whether an exemption is
available. Under this test the court seeks to determine whether a
party charged with antitrust violations was authorized to engage
antitrust laws. ld. A private party may be immune where it has acted "pursuant to an
anticompetitive state regulatory program to which it was required by the state to conform
[and the state has] an independent regulatory interest." id. As to validity, the statute
must satisfy a four-part test.
Under the test, it must be shown that the private party's conduct is compelled by
the state pursuant to a state scheme that conflicts with the antitrust laws, that the
anticompetitive conduct is necessary to make the state scheme work (and even then
the antitrust laws will be repealed only to the minimum extent necessary), and that
the state's interest in its scheme outweighs the federal interest in competition.
Id.
68. A few lower court decisions have dealt with anticompetitive acts of cities. See,
e.g., Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359, .'362-63 (N.D. Tex. 1974)
(city bus company with exclusive airport franchise held per se exempt under Parker). But
see Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that a municipal
corporation conspiring to boycott a supplier's products as not per se exempt from the
antitrust laws). See also New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.
1974) (state and several of its political subdivisions sued for conspiring to violate the
antitrust laws).
69. The lack of a concern with the substance of the disputed conduct formed the
principal basis of Slater's criticism of the available doctrinal tests. In particular, he
criticized a final decision rule which looks to the independence of the decisionmaker in
deciding the state action question. The difficulty with such a rule is that it "focuses not
so much on the type of state action as on the interests of the parties who implemented
the program." Slater, supra note 38, at 91-92.
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in such conduct by the legislature. 70 Although the basic requirement is that the legislature take some action authorizing the
conduct, courts differ on the degree of affirmative articulation
required. For some courts a general enabling-act statute setting
up a public instrumentality is sufficient to render all conduct
immune from the operation of antitrust laws/ 1 Even under this
broad view, the limitation would apply which forbids any attempt to immunize private conduct clearly proscribed by the
antitrust laws. 72 Other courts, however, require more specific articulation that the party have authority to engage in the particular anticompetitive activity at issue. 73
Most courts begin their analysis by determining whether the
legislative intent or statutory purpose is clear on the face of the
statute. Ordinarily, however, they do not restrict their inquiry to
70. In Lafayette the Court spoke in terms of both authorization and direction. The
Court appears to have used these terms interchangeably. As the dissent pointed out, the
distinction may be an important one since a city that is merely authorized to engage in
anticompetitive conduct "cannot be certain it will not be subject to antitrust liability" if
it provides monopoly service. 435 U.S. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The ambiguity
regarding whether authorization or direction is required raises the issue of whether the
plurality, in adopting authorization as a test, intended to modify the Goldfarb test which
requires that the anticompetitive action was compelled by the state, not merely prompted.
See text accompanying notes 96-106 infra.
71. See Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1561-64.
72. This limitation on the mere attempt to immunize action otherwise forbidden by
the Sherman Act is reflected in the Court's holding in Parker that "a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by
declaring that their action is lawful." 317 U.S. at 351 (citing Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 332, 344-47 (1904)). A later case, Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), indicated the continuing validity of the limitation
suggested in Parker. The Court stated that "[t]he fact that a state authorizes the price
fixing does not, of course, give immunity to the scheme, absent approval by Congress."
341 U.S. at 386.
The limitation of the mere attempt to immunize is not so significant in the context
municipalities since the legislature is presumably not authorizing a subdivision to
in activity clearly forbidden under the Sherman Act. The question which arises is
be less clear-cut than an attempt to immunize. The limitation therefore is not
in defining the scope of the municipality exemption.
73. Under this narrow view, a party charged with an antitrust violation would have
show not only that he acted pursuant to general powers delegated to him by the
but also that the legislature actually considered and approved the specific
conduct. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. li09 (W.D. Pa. 1969),
which the court disallowed a state action defense by an insurance company regulated
the Pennsylvania Insurance Department. Although the department had a wide range
powers to set premiums and establish rates of payment, the court held that the insurcompany could not claim an exemption because the department had not contemthat the company use anticompetitive means. See also George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc.
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). See notes 12-13 supra (discussthe ambiguity as to degree of articulation required by the Lafayette court).
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statutory language 74 but also examine such factors as legislative
history 75 and state policy. 76
1.

RATlONALE FOR THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT TEST

There are several obvious reasons underlying this doctrinal
test, all of which involve finding a strong indication that the state
legislature meant to provide an alternative to the competitive
market system. The first purpose of requiring legislative articulation is that it permits a court to determine if a state regulatory
policy is actually involved. 77 The existence of some legislative
articulation is good evidence that a state regulatory policy is involved and that the policy may be worth protecting. 78
Another major purpose behind the test is that it helps to
ensure that the exemption will only be available in instances
where the legislature has consciously and affirmatively enacted
a regulatory scheme to replace the ideal of enforced competition.7ll
When no such considered scheme is present, but only
"uncontrolled anticompetitive behavior,"«o granting an exemption may be unwise.
Finally, requiring articulation provides some assurance that
the state, in balancing policies, took adequate account of the
74. The Fifth Circuit in Lafayette properly held that judicial inquiry must go beyond the statutes themselves. 532 F.2d at 431, 435 n.9.
75. See Parker, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also text accompanying notes 45-49 supra
(discussing the use of the legislative history in Parker); Note, Parker Revisited, supra note
67, at 905 n.43.
76. See Bates v. State Bar of .AJizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977) (policy of allowing
state to regulate activities of state bar), diswssed in text accompanying notes 115-19 infra;
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (policy of federalism); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc.
v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1970) (state policy in favor of
competitive bidding).
77. As one writer explained, if there is no state regulatory policy involved, no
"rational purpose could be served by recognition of a state action defense." Note, Parher
Revisited, supra note 67, at 921. The writer's reasoning is somewhat unsatisfactory, however, because he apparently assumes that merely because a state statute exists, a state
policy deserving protection from antitrust challenge also exists.
78. It should be noted that the assumption that a grant of immunity is justified
merely because that statute conclusively indicates that a state policy is at stake may be
ill.founded. See Tchorni, supra note 2. at 1563.
79. The desire of courts to ensure that the regulatory schemes pwtectad under the
state action doctrine embody an affirmative alternative to enforced competition has been
identified as the "surrogate for competition" test. Handler, Antitrust Review, supra note
36, at 9; Slater, supra note 38, at 91. For an example of the importance attached to this
test, see Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 137 (8th Cir. 1970)
(sustaining the claim of state action in part because the state had announced a public
policy "against free competiton in an industry essential to it" and regulated "that
industry, even to the extent of eliminating competition").
80. Handler, Antitrust Review, supra note 36, at 9.
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federal antitrust interests. 81 If the court were to extend a blanket
exemption, without imposing the requirements of articulation, it
is unlikely that the legislature would feel compelled to engage in
an explicit and overt weighing process. 82 Without the weighing
process, states will consider only their own interest in regulation
without regard to the possible anticompetitive effects. 8:1
2.

PROBLEMS WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT TEST

Although the legislative intent test may be useful as a device
limiting the availability of the state action exemption and
ensuring that antitrust interests are adequately considered by
regulators, the focus of the test is incorrect because it diverts
·attention from the underlying policies. Courts applying the test
interpreted its requirements differently and consequently
ve demanded different degrees of articulation. 84 To the extent
81. Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1974). Additionally, Posner states:
Under federalism reasoning, part of the justification for the exemption must be that,
from the vantage point of the sta_te, other policies outweigh competition and may be
implemented with minimal injury to the interests normally secured by the competitive process. Therefore, it makes sense to require that the choice be faced openly.
at 715.
82. Id. at 715.
83. The plurality was particularly concerned with the problem of a municipality
regulatory schemes without having assessed the possible antitrust consequences.
were free to make economic choices counseled solely by their own
pur·uc•mu interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in
of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the ·comprehensive
policy Congress established." 435 U.S. at 408.
Two recent cases in which courts adopted some form a legislative intent test but
in regard to the degree of articulation needed are E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v.
Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966) and George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). In Wiggins, the court adopted
view of the state action exemption and held that a broad delegation of powers
blic instrumentality was sufficient to render its anticompetitive conduct immune.
362 F.2d at 55. Under Wiggins, if the statute made an agency a public instrumenthe agency exercised powers generally conferred on it and thus performed
al government functions, the agency's conduct would be immune from the antitrust
/d.
In Whitten, however, the court demanded a more specific articulation that the legislamandated anticompetive activity in a designated field. That court rejected a Parker
because the legislature had failed to provide such articulation. See Note,
""n'<m,pn.r Action and Antitrust Immunity, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 521, 526 (1971)
cited as Note, Governmental Action). The Whitten court narrowly read
and would uphold an exemption only when "government determines that competinot the summum bonum in a particular field and deliberately attempts to provide
form of public regulation." Whitten, 424 F.2d at 30.
ru••nnum both Whitten and Wiggins apparently focused on the degree of legislative
in determining whether an exemption should be available, it is clear that both
at least implicitly, took some account of underlying policy. Thus, the Wiggins
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courts focus on the degree of articulation, they may neglect the
policies which are the real basis for exemption.
Some courts scrutinizing legislative enactments have recognized this problem and seem to have supplemented their inquiry
in order to vindicate the underlying policies. Rr, The fact that
courts employing a legislative intent test supplement their inquiry by reference to underlying policies suggests that the test
cannot be the exclusive criterion for deciding the availability of
an exemption. Moreover, the test has several other weaknesses
which impair its usefulness as a tool in analyzing the municipality issue.
The first problem in requiring that the state legislature specifically authorized the disputed conduct in the municipality context is that the required articulation is unlikely to exist. State
legislatures delegate broad authority to municipalities to exercise
poiice and health powers, RG typically through the enactment of a
general authorizing statuteY This creates a problem, for where
there is nothing more than a general grant of authority with no
investigation of the desirability of anticompetitive activity,Kx
decision upholding the exemption can be explained by the fact that the public instrumen.
tality was not profit motivated. Since courts are more willing to imply an exception when
the disputed conduct is without a profit motive, Wiggins may be understood in terms of
underlying policy. The Whitten. decision may also be explained in terms of underlying
policy. Because the state legislature had specifically enacted a statute in favor of competitive bidding, the court concluded that the legislature could not have intended the agency
to engage in anticompetitive conduct, since to so intend would have undermined the state
policy in favor of such bidding.
85. See note 84 supra. Similarly, in Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Alumi·
num Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), policy probably shaped the outcome of
the case. In Woods, the court refused to extend a state action exemption to a party who
had submitted false reports to a state agency. The defendant's strategy was to persuade
the state agency to adopt low production allowances for an oil field, thus driving out
marginal competitors. The court's technical ground for rejecting the state action defense
was that the submission of false data prevented defendant's conduct from merging with
that of the state. Thus no state action was involved. ld. at 1295. The decision could be
explained on the ground that the submission of false data to state agencies should be
discouraged. One commentator has explained this case and other similar cases by saying
that "[w)hat the courts have really demonstrated in these cases is that state action which
is so ill-advised as to serve no state purpose will be insufficient to invoke a Parker exemption." Slater, surpa note 38, at 97.
86. Thus, municipalities "may enact ordinances prescribing rules and conduct relating to their corporate affairs, limited only by constitutional and statutory restraints."
Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1559.
87. This lack of specific delegation is particularly troublesome where the municipality operates under a home rule charter. "Home rule charters represent the most significant
limitation on state power over local subdivisions." Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1559. For a
discussion of how widespread state provisions for home rule are, see Vanlandingham,
Municipal Home Rule in. the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269, 280 (1968). cited
in Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 434 n.15 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88. Louisiana's laws are typical. Investor-owned utilities are regulated by the Louis-
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ambiguous inferences may be drawn. Since the delegation is
broad, one could conclude the legislature intended the power to
be broad enough to include the anticompetitive conduct of a
municipality. 89 Alternatively, it could be inferred that since the
legislature was silent about anticompetitive activity, the activity
is not "required. " 90
The test also has other drawbacks which suggest that even
if it could be implemented it should not be. The test impairs
delegation of authority by states to municipalities. One of the
advantages of our present system of government is that a state
may share power with its subdivisions. 91 A state may decide to
permit the subdivisions to exercise a variety of police powers
without having to seek specific prior approval of such acts. 92 The
system of delegation serves important state interests since it permits the state to devote the necessary time to statewide interests
and permits municipalities to deal flexibly with problems the
state could not have anticipated. 93 As the Lafayette dissent
pointed out, the plurality "by demanding extensive legislative
control over municipal action, will necessarily diminish the extent to which a State can share its power with autonomous local
governmental bodies" 94 and still retain the advantages of the
Parker antitrust immunity exemption.
Under the legislative intent test a municipality will have
difficulty qualifying its conduct as state action if the test is
strictly read. The adoption of such a test, therefore, signifies
nothing more than a refusal to extend the state action exemption
to municipalities. It is equivalent to a per se denial of immunity
and precludes analysis of whether the particular circumstances
warrant an exemption. 95 Although the legislative intent test does
iana Public Service Commission, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:1163 (West 1978). Article IV,
§ 21(C) of the Louisiana State Constitution provides that: "The commission shall have
no power to regulate any . . . public utility owned, operated, or regulated . . . by the
governing authority of one or more political subdivisions . . . . "
89. See Brief for Appellee at 20-22, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); C.D. SANDS, 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsTRUCTION 108 (4th
ed. 1974) ("a grant of express power carries with it all unexpressed incidental powers
necessary to carry it into effect").
90. The use of legislative silence as a basis for denying an exemption is inadequate,
however. It ignores the inability of a legislature to antitipate fully every activity which a
subdivision must engage in to function efficiently. Therefore, since it is unlikely that this
approach will render a definitive result, the court's inquiry cannot be limited to the factors
which the legislature has actually examined.
91. 435 U.S. at 434 (Stewart, J ., dissenting).
92. Id. (Stewart, J ., dissenting).
93. ld. at 435 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. ld. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
95. As one student writer noted, the test precludes an analysis of "the precise scope
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not rule out a balancing approach if it is treated only as a threshold inquiry, such a balancing would be foreclosed when the test
is the conclusive focus of the municipality decision. Nevertheless
the test may prove useful if considered in conjunction with ~
determination of the policies which would be served by granting
or denying immunity.
B.

Goldfarb and the Compulsion Test

A corollary to the legislative intent test is the requirement or
compulsion test. Courts employing the test are chiefly concerned
with limiting the availability of the state action exemption. To
claim an immunity, a party must show not only that the state
prompted his conduct, but also that it compelled it.
The test originated in Goldfarb u. Virginia State Bar, 96 in
which the plaintiff challenged a minimum fee schedule of a
county bar association on the ground that it violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 97 The county bar association adhered to the
schedule at the prompting of the state bar, 9R an administrative
agency of the Virginia Supreme Court. Both the state and county
bar associations claimed that their actions were exempt from the
Sherman Act as state action. 99 The Court concluded that neither
bar association could claim a state action exemption because the
state had not required their activities. In order to be exempt from
the antitrust laws, the conduct had to be compelled by the direction of the state as a sovereign. Thus, "[t]he threshold inquiry
in determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the
activity is required by the State acting as sovereign." 11111
of the powers delegated to the government agency, e.nd of the corollary question of legislative or executive consideration of the benefits of regulation as opposed to competition."
Note, Governmental Action, supra note 84, at 522.
96. 421 u.s. 773 (1974).
97. fd.at77R.
98. Although the state bar never took any formal action to enforce the fee schedules,
it prompted adherence through the publication of two fee-schedule reports and through
the issuance of ethical opinions. I d. at 776-77.
99. id. at 779.
100. !d. at 790. The Court based its conclusion that the requisite compulsion did
not exist on two facts. First, there was no Virginia statute requiring the anticompetitive
activity. Second, there was no indication that the state supreme court had approved the
actions of the state bar encouraging adherence to such minimum fee schedules. One
difficulty with the Court's reasoning is that the county bar might have been able to
provide protection against an antitrust action merely by securing legislative authorization
for the fee schedule. The problem with a test which focuses on the existence of an authorizing statute is that it emphasizes the extent of delegation, not the merits of a particular
case. Thus, even if it were clear than an exemption were undesirable, if the bar association
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The test has its origins in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp. 101 Schwegmann involved a Louisiania statute
which required retailers to maintain minimum resale prices.' 112
Louisiana law, moreover, authorized enforcement of the pricefixing agreement against both signers and nonsigners of the agreement.'03 Nevertheless, the Court found the state's authorization of the price-fixing scheme was itself insufficient to give immunity to what was essentially private anticompetitive conduct.104 It held that a state could not immunize private conduct
··. merely by permitting it. 105
The basic reason for the compulsion test is that it limits the
· availability of a state action exemption to cases where there is a
strong showing that the state specifically approved the disputed
.conduct. The test prevents a broad extension of the exemption by
it to parties who are actually acting on their own, but
seeking to shield their conduct under the state action doctrine.
While this may be a worthy goal, the compulsion test is not
particularly helpful in determining the appropriateness of a municipality exemption because the test does not translate well into
the municipality context. The broad delegation of power to mu.
alities will often make it impossible to characterize the local
as compelled by the state.' 00 The test is more appropriate
private parties seeking to claim the exemption, since it enaa court to determine if there is any governmental interest at
When a governmental entity claims the exemption, how' the imposition of the compulsion test is superfluous. 107 By
successfully lobbied for a statute permitting anticompetitive conduct, the Court
have been forced to give the exemption effect.
101. 341 u.s. 384 (1951).
102. ld. at 385.
103. ld. at 386-87.
104. ld. at 389.
105. ld. at 386.
106. A particular problem in applying the compulsion test to municipalities is that
unclear whether a state's grant of a municipal charter is, without more, the equivaof compelling the municipality to act, or whether the compulsion standard should
to all actions taken by municipalities." Tchomi, supra note 2, at 1556. "Yet another
left unanswered by the Supreme Court is whether the judiciary should accord
compulsion the same respect as state compulsion in treating the required
as beyond the scope of the federal antitrust laws." !d. at 1556.
107. As Justice Stewart noted in the dissent:
·State compulsion is an appropriate requirement when private persons claim that
·their anticompetitive actions are not their own but the State's, since a State cannot
immunize private anticompetitive conduct merely by permitting it. But it is senseto require a showing of state compulsion when the state itself acts through one
· of its governmental subdivisions.
435 U.S. at 4S1-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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equating municipalities and private parties, the test blurs the
important distinction between governmental and private action
and thus is inappropriate in the municipality context.
'
C.

Status of the Antitrust Defendant

Another test developed to define the scope of state action
exemption is based on the status of the defendant. 111x This test
differs from the other two doctrinal tests because, instead of emphasizing the intent of the state legislature or the particularity
of delegation, it focuses on whether the decisionmaker is a state
or private party.
1.

THE FOCUS ON STATUS IN PARKER AND SUBSEQUENT CASES

Parker provided the impetus for an exemption based on official status. In that case the Court held that if a state or its officers
were engaged in activities directed by the legislature, the conduct
was exempt. ttlo Since the Court in Parker expressly incorporated
the official status of the defendants in its holding that state action is exempt from the antitrust laws, it wa,s unclear whether
private parties or municipalities could successfully raise a state
action defense. Furthermore, the Court did not indicate the degree of state delegation or supervision needed in cases where the
defendant was not a state or authorized officer. Nevertheless,
subsequent decisions made it clear that the exemption would be
available to private parties in certain limited circumstances. 1111 A
non public party could claim an exemption if he acted under coercion of state law or if the degree of state supervision was sufficiently great to render the action state action. 111
In Gas Light Co. u. Georgia Power Co. 112 the Fifth Circuit
found that defendant's actions, approved by the Georgia Public
Service Commission after extensive hearings, were exempt from
108. For an interesting discussion of this test, see Sherrill, supra note 67, at 90R-18.
109. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352.
110. As Chief Justice Burger remarked in his concurring opinion in Cantor v. Detroit.
Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976): "If Parker's holding were limited simply to the nonliability
of state officials, then the Court's inquiry in Goldfarb as to the County Bar Association's
claimed exemptions could have ended upon our recognition that the organization was a
'voluntary association and not a state agency . . . . '" 428 U.S. at 790 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). "Yet, before determining that there was no exemption from the antitrust
laws, the Court proceeded to treat the Association's contention that its action, having been
'prompted' by the State Bar, was 'state action for Sherman Act purposes.'" ld. at 604
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790
(1974)).
111. Posner, supra note 81, at 694-95.
112. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
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the antitrust laws because the conduct involved state action. 113
The Gas Light decision is significant because it illustrates that
when a private party seeks immunity under the state action doctrine, a court will carefully scrutinize the claim to determine the
degree of the state's involvement. If the state is substantially
involved in regulating the disputed conduct, a private party may
be able to successfully claim state action immunity, but if the
state's involvement is only minor, the immunity may be unavailable. Holding that a private party may claim immunity if the
state is substantially involved implies that a court would almost
certainly find an exemption if the state itself were the defendant.11~

The focus on the official status of parties was also present in
Bates v. State Bar. 115 In determining that the ban on lawyer advertising was exempt from antitrust liability, the Bates Court
emphasized the status of the antitrust defendant. Although the
action had been brought against the state bar, the Court found
that the real party in interest was the Arizona Supreme Court. 116
Further, although the state bar played a role in the enforcement
of the rules promulgated by the court, it was an agent of the state
supreme court, and was under its continuous supervision. 117
113. In Gas Light a distributor of natural gas brought an action against one of its
an electric company, for alleged violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
at 1136. The Georgia Public Service Commission regulated the rates and services of
both plaintiff and defendant and had approved the alleged anticompetitive practices. The
defendant claimed, and the trial court agreed, that since the disputed practices were
approved by the state, they were necessarily the products of state action and so fell outside
the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. !d. at 1138.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit upheld the finding of state action. Not only had the
Public Service Commission approved the disputed rates and practices, but it had done
so only after extensive consideration in full adversary hearings. !d. at 1139-40.
But see Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th
Cir. 1971), in which the court held that because an independent state agency had the
authority to approve the program, the state action exemption was applicable even though
the state had never actively supervised the anticompetitive conduct. The court concluded
that mere silence amounted to agency approval and thus brought the conduct within the
of the state action exemption. ld. at 252.
114. However, there is apparently a tendency in more recent cases to narrow the
scope of the state action defense and a corresponding reluctance to reach facile conclusions
of valid state action. See note 66 supra.
115. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates two lawyers who had set up a legal services clinic
charged with violating the state supreme court's ban on lawyer advertising. !d. at
The lawyers defended on the ground that the ban violated § § 1 and 2 of the Sherman
because of its tendency to restrict competition. !d. at 356.
116. "The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules,
it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process." !d. at 361.
117. ld. The importance which the Court attached to official state status was renot only in the Court's conclusion that the supreme court was the real party in
but also in the manner in which the Court distinguished the earlier opinion of
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2.

PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUS TEST

However, even in Bates, the Court did not restrict its inquiry
to that criterion alone. Rather the Court examined the underlying
policy of the need to protect a local interest in regulation. 11 R The
Court apparently was aware of the problem inherent in the status
test: its sole focus on the nature of the antitrust defendant is
unsatisfactory since, by avoiding the underlying policy concerns
it begs the question of whether a municipality should be ex-'
empt.119 An approach which focuses directly on these policies,
especially with regard to the hybrid nature of municipalities,
would be preferable.' 20
D.

Doctrinal Tests Applied in Lafayette

In contrast to the willingness of the Court in prior cases to
supplement the doctrinal tests with an examination of underlying
policy, 121 the plurality and dissent were unwilling to engage in a
substantive policy analysis to resolve the immunity issue in
Lafayette. 122 The cities in Lafayette argued that under Parker
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U .8. 579 ( 1976). Se£ Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1571. The
Bates Court suggested that Cantor was distinguishable because the action had been
brought against a private party, implying that if the state had been named as defendant,
the Court might have decided the case differently and granted the exemption. According
to one authOl', the narrow reading of Parker in Bates which would restrict the state action
doctrine to instances in which the state or its authorized officers are parties in interest
conflicts "with both logic and precedent." Sherrill, supra note 67, at 910. See also
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
118. The Bates Court concluded that the disputed regulation could not be invalida·
ted without threatening the ability of the state supreme court to regulate the activities of
the bar. Since there was an important state interest in such regulation, the Court con·
eluded it would be appropriate to grant an exemption.
!19. One author has criticized the narrow reading which limits Parker to state
agents on the ground that the "distinction between agents and non-agents [may bear]
no necessary relationship to the distinction between conduct worthy of the label 'state
action' and purely private activity." Sherrill, supra note 67, e.t 909.
120. Although the Court in Bates regarded status as a relevant point of inquiry, it
did not focus exclusively on that issue, but examined the underlying policies to be served
by an exemption from the antitrust laws. This disposition to examine underlying policies
even when apparently focusing on a mechanical test was also reflected in Parker, where
the Court explicitly relied on legislative intent, but implicitly relied on a weighing of
competing policies of federaiism and antitrust concerns.
121. See text accompanying notes 46-54 and notes 84-85, 118 supra.
122. Although the Lafayette Court apparently adopted a per se approach based on
the presence or absence of legislative articulation, the Court did indicate that policies
might be important.
[T]he conclusion that the antitrust laws are not to be construed as meant by Congress to subject cities to liability under the antitrust laws must rest on the impact of
some overriding public policy which negates the construction of coverage, and not
upon a reading of "person" or "persons" as not including them.
435 U.S. at 397. The plurality also expressed its pragmatic concern that granting an
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their status as governmental entities entitled them to an exemption from the antitrust laws. 123 By invoking the legislative intent
test to resolve the more general question of state action exemption, the plurality rejected the argument that governmental status alone shall give rise to exemption entitlement. To support its
rejection of that argument the plurality narrowly construed the
state action doctrine. The Court was unwilling to allow municipalities to claim antitrust immunity under state action exemption unless specific legislative authorization was present. 124
The plurality further demonstrated its preference for a narrow construction of the state- action exemption in its discussion
of Goldfarb and Bates. The plurality thought those cases were
significant primarily for the limits they placed on parties seeking
to claim an exemption. Goldfarb limited the exemption to activities compelled by the state 125 and Bates limited it to anticompetitive conduct which was part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme. 126 By adopting this approach, the plurality effectively
ignored the key issue raised by the governmental nature of municipalities. If it had analyzed the issue, it might have concluded
that competing policies rendered the governmental nature of the
municipal activities insufficient to warrant an exemption. The
plurality, however, avoided the question altogether.
The dissent adopted a similar per se approach, but reached
the opposite conclusion. It postulated that the key distinction to
be drawn is whether the regulation was governmental or private
conduct. 127 Since the cities' conduct was clearly governmental,
the dissent stated, they should be entitled to an exemption. 128
The difficulty with the approach of both the dissent and the
plurality, as well as with the traditional doctrinal tests, is that
· they are improperly focused. Important factors which ·should bear
on an analysis of the immunity question are excluded from consideration.
~eJ(emptHm

to municipalities might lead to widespread noncompliance with the antitrust
. Id. at 408. See also text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
123. 435 U.S. at 408.
124. ld. at 409.
125. id.
Id. at 410.
ld. at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 30 supra.
435 U.S. at 429. "There can be no doubt on which side of this line the petitionactions fall. 'Municipal corporations are instrumentalities of the State for the convenadministration of government within their limits.'" ld. (Stewart, J., dissenting)
omitted).
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III.
A.

8 UBSTANTIVE

TESTS

Need for a Test that Looks to the Nature of the Conduct

The traditional doctrinal tests are not by themselves sufficient to answer the municipality question. The tests are really
fictions or labels that courts have developed to justify the grant
or denial of an exemption in a particular case. While the specific
criterion in each test may be a relevant factor, without a consideration of policies it cannot provide a satisfactory method for assessing claims of immunity from the antitrust laws.
An examination of policies which would justify granting the
exemption is even more necessary in the context of municipal
conduct than it is in the context of state conduct. Since municipalities cannot be accurately characterized as either state or private action, but are a hybrid consisting of aspects of both, courts
must assess municipal conduct on a case-by-case basis. In order
to determine how the conduct of the municipality fits into the
tension between federalism and antitrust enforcement, a court
must look to the nature of the challenged activity.m
An approach based on the nature of the challenged conduct
has several advantages, all of which would prove useful in answering the municipality question. First, it would encourage a caseby-case adjudication. This would discourage courts from analyzing the issues in a narrow or mechanical way. Further, by turning
the attention to the interests being served by the municipal regulations, it would discourage the kind of per se approach advocated
by both the plurality and dissent in Lafayette.
B.

A Substantive Approach Based on the Regulatory/
Proprietary Distinction
1.

JUDICIAL AND CRITICAL SUPPORT

One judicial doctrine which may prove helpful in determining the availability of an exemption for municipalities is based
on a distinction between regulatory and proprietary activity. 130
129. The faiiure of the doctrinal tests to consider the nature of the challenged conduct has formed the principal basis of Slater's criticism of these judicial approaches.
Thus, the trouble with one such approach, the final decision rule, which bases the availability of a state action exemption on whether the decisionmaker is independent, is that it
"focuses not so much on the type of state action involved as on the interests of the parties
who implemented the program." Slater, supra note 38, at 91-92. For an example of an
opinion which did focus on the nature of the activity, see Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444
F.Zd at 947. In that case the court concluded that the nature of the interest-regulation
of football activities in the District of Columbia-was not sufficiently important to justify
overriding the existing antitrust laws.
130. The importance of drawing a regulatory/proprietary distinction has been recog-
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Under such a distinction a court determines whether the disputed conduct is of an essentially governmental or profit-making
nature. To the extent municipalities engage in purely commercial
activities, they would be, under such a test, denied an exemption
from the antitrust laws.
The distinction has been recognized by courts in defining the
scope of the state action exemption, particularly in the context
of municipalities.l 31 In Parker itself, Chief Justice Stone intimated that a regulatory/proprietary distinction should be drawn.
He suggested that the case might have been decided differently
if there were a "question of the state or its municipality becoming
a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade." 132
More explicit judicial support for the use of the regulatory/proprietary distinction in determining the proper scope of
the state action exemption can be found in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States. 133 In Union Pacific the Court suggested
that a governmental body does not enjoy absolute antitrust immunity if it engages in a profit-making venture. In that case
Kansas City entered into a joint financing of a new market at a
railroad terminal. Since another city operated a comparable
nearby market, Kansas City concluded that the amount of business available was insufficient to permit a split market to survive. n~ In order to ensure the success of their venture, Kansas
nized by courts and commentators alike. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52
(1943); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29, 34
(lst Cir. 1970); E.W. Wiggins v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1966);
Azarro v. Town of Branford, [1974-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 98,063,98,064 (D. Conn. 1974);
Reid v. University of Minn., 107 F. Supp. 439, 441 (D. Minn. 1952). But see Lafayette,
532 F.2d at 433; Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Mo.-Ill. Met. Dis.,
433 F.2d 131, 135 (8th Cir. 1970). See also Handler, Antitrust Review, supra note 36, at
18, Jacobs, State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
221, 239 (1975); Kennedy, supra note 67, at 72-75, Posner, supra note 81, at 705-06;
Slater, supra note 38, at 90; Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1556-61. This distinction is a particularly important one to draw in the context of municipalities because a municipal
corporation may have a "dual character[.] [I]t may act in either a governmental or
proprietary capacity." Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1557 (citing 1 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 2.09, at 146-47 (3d ed. 1971)).
131. "Distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions is important
in the context of municipal activities because courts traditionally afford this dichotomy
substantial respect in determining the extent of municipalities." Tchomi, supra note 2,
at 1556.
132. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52, cited in Slater, supra note 38, at 90. One commentator has noted that "[a]lthough Parker and its progeii'y do suggest a recognition that a
state's sovereign actions are more likely to be exempt from the antitrust laws than are its
actions taken in other capacities, they leave unsettled the importance of this distinction
in determining the exemption." Tchorni, supra note 2, at 1556.
133. 313 u.s. 450 (1941).
134. !d. at 452.
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City authorized payments giving the dealers free rent and moving
expenses. The rival city brought an action alleging violations of
the Elkins Act anti-rebate provisions. 135 The Kansas court upheld
the actions of Kansas City as valid governmental acts. On appeal the Supreme Court held that since any action by any person
to bring about discrimination in interstate commerce was unlawful under the Elkins Act, an injunction restraining the anticompetitive practices of the city was valid. 136 Since Kansas City was
acting in a proprietary capacity, it neither had antitrust immunity nor could it confer immunity on others. 137
The distinction has value in defining the proper scope of the
exemption of municipalities. First, it embodies a policy inherent
in Parker-a governmental unit acting in a regulatory capacity
is not motivated by a desire to maximize profits. 138 Regulatory
conduct is motivated by a desire to enhance the social and economic welfare of citizens and is based, in theory, on an assessment by the governmental unit of the inadequacy of normal market forces to achieve this end. Where the local governmental unit
has weighed the benefits and drawbacks of competition and decided that regulation is necessary and the activity is regulatory
in nature, anticompetitive effects may be justified. i 39
A very different situation obtains if the governmental unit
acts as a proprietor. In such situations a stricter standard of scrutiny should be imposed in deciding whether the activity should
be immune from the antitrust laws. As a proprietor, a governmental entity is encouraged by profit maximization. 140 Any competitive effects are in conflict with the desire to maxir11ize profits.
Only self-restraint limits the harm from such interference with
the market. 111
Second, unlike the other tests, the distinction encourages a
135. The Elkins Act malces it unlawful for "any person, persons, or corporation to
offer, grant, or give, or to solicit, accept, or receive any rebate, concession, or discrimination in respect to the transportation of any property in interstate or foreign commerce
. . . . " 32 Stat. 847, 34 Stat. 587 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1976)). It should
be noted that the Lafayette Court considered the definitional ianguage to be similar to
that used in § 8 of the Sherman Act. 435 U.S. at 401 n.19.
l;:)b, Union Pacific, 313 U.S. at 463, '!74.
137. See Slater, supra note 38, at 90.
138. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
139. The prototype of this approach is Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In
Nebbia the Court recognized that local governmental units may interfere with the free
market so long as the scope of regulation is reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
Thus, in Nebbia the Court, applying a due process analysis to local regulation, recognized
that in certain circumstances divergence from the competitive system was justified.
140. R. HAVERMAN & K. KNOPF, THE MARKET SYSTEM 200 (2d ed. 1970).
141. 1 A. KAHN, THE EcoNOMics oF REGULATION 3 (1970).
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case-by-case adjudication based on the nature of the municipality's anticompetitive activity. In applying the other tests, a court
does not have to engage in any substantive analysis of the municipality's conduct. It must only examine whether the legislature
passed an authorizing statute or the state compelled the disputed
conduct. Consequently, under such a test, if the municipality
acts under an umbrella of state action, the particular nature of
the subdivision's conduct is unimportant. The regulatory/proprietary test encourages a substantive analysis. This apu•''~--- is preferable because the hybrid nature of municipalities
indicates that there is no easy answer to the immunity issue. To
arrive at a satisfactory solution case-by-case adjudication is reFurther, the test would permit courts to consider pragmatic
about the potential for widespread noncompliance with
antitrust laws. 142 It would do so by allowing the courts to
· municipalities to regulate in key areas that traditionally
been the subject 'to local regulation, while disallowing nonatory municipal activity. If the Lafayette Court had drawn
is distinction, municipal zoning and licensing dedsions, for
mple, might remain beyond the scope of the antitrust laws, 143
ile the purely proprietary activity at issue in Lafayette would
be immune. 144 Moreover, the nature of the conduct was so
that self-restraint could not have been expected to proan adequate safeguard. In spite of the availability of this
guideline under which the state action exemption could
been denied, however, the Court avoided such an analysis.
DRAWBACKS OF THE REGULATORY/PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION AS A
CONCLUSIVE TEST

The regulatory/proprietary test is preferable to the blanket
tive intent rule adopted in Lafayette or the traditional tests
· the status of the defendant or compulsion by the state.
v"'"'"'"'"'· it should not be wholly dispositive of the availabilSee, e.g., Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408. See also notes 63-64 supra and accompanyBut see note 59 supra, in which the potential for an antitrust challenge to
zoning is discussed.
144. Chief Justice Burger asserted that it was an unchallenged presumption that the
were engaged in proprietary activity. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J.,
. The dissent, however, disagreed with this characterization of the cities' ac"[T]he District Court's 'conclusion' . . . that the petitioners' electric utility serva business activity engaged in for profit was not supported by any evidence (since
was decided on a petition to dismiss} . . . . " ld. at 432 n.10 (Stewart, J., dissent-
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ity of the claimed immunity. 1 ~ 5 As the dissent points out in
Lafayette, the distinction is not always a clear one. 1 ~ 6 The Court
has termed the distinction between governmental and nongovermental activities "a quagmire" 117 and "untenable. " 1 ~R The difficulty of the test is illustrated by an example which the dissent
posed: "(I]f a city or State decides to provide water services to
its citizens at cost . . . , is its action to be characterized as
'proprietary'?" 149 Since it will not always be clear when an action
is proprietary and when it is governmental, the Court should not
adopt this test as the sole criterion.
Moreover, because the distinction necessarily focuses on the
nature of the challenged state or local activity and does not concern itself with relative importance of this activity, it is not designed to account for the fundamental national interest in fostering free competition. Thus, the regulatory/proprietary test by itself is insufficient because its focus is too limited. Its advantages
suggest that it should be the first part of a two-part test used to
resolve the municipality question.
C.

Second-level Scrutiny: Regulatory/Proprietary
Supplemented by a Balancing 1'ext

The federal antitrust laws play an important rule in a free
market. American society has decided that the best way to ensure
adequate economic performance is through a considerable degree
of free competition. 150 The antitrust laws are designed to achieve
that goal and are useful in preventing distortions in the allocation
of resources, protecting consumers by insuring the availability of
quality goods at a fair price, 151 and preserving small competitors. ts2
In spite of the fundamental impmtance of the antitrust laws
in achieving the ideal of free competition in American society,
courts have sometimes interpreted these laws narrowly. They
145. Not all courts have agreed with the suggestion in Parker and Union Pacific thal
the regulatory/proprietary distinction is an important one in defining the scope o!' state
action. In Lafayette, the Court ignored the district court's finding that the activity was
proprietary, 435 U.S. at 392-94, and in Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency,
433 F.2d 131 (Bth Cir. 1970), the court expressly disavowed the importance of the distinction in determining an exemption. The court called the distinction a "fallacy." ld. at 135.
146. 435 U.S. at 432-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
147. Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 67-68 (1955).
148. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
149. 435 U.S. at 434 (Stewart, J ., dissenting).
150. See note 50 supra.
151. See Note, A Preemption Analysis, supm note 40, at 1170.
152. ld.
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have accorded deference to state regulatory schemes, even when
those schemes conflict with national antitrust policy or laws. 153
State regulation arises in part as a response to market imperfections.15~ Thus, although the antitrust laws provide that the
optimum economic solution lies in competition, in some contexts
competition may be an unattainable, or even undesirable goal. 155
At times a regulated monopoly is needed to avoid the dangers of
cut-throat competition. 156
State regulatory schemes often bring about results inconsistent with the free market economy embodied in the antitrust
laws. 157 Because of the importance of preserving comity for local
units of government through federalism, allowing local units to
regulate economically when necessary, and ensuring competition
through the antitrust laws, this conflict needs to be resolved. The
major shortcoming of the regulatory/proprietary approach is that
because it is concerned with only the regulatory side of the conflict, it cannot achieve a balance.
Several approaches have been suggested to achieve that balance. To defend antitrust policies against conflicting state laws,
Professor Posner has suggested that certain technical or mechanical tests be used to enable a federal court to limit the application
of state law. 158 Although he conceded that Parker appeared to
foreclose that alternative, 156 he has argued that the antitrust laws
are sufficiently important to justify a narrowing of the Parker
doctrine. Posner would require the state to consider antitrust
interests in deciding to regulate. In doing so the state would be
.forced to face its choice to enact an anticompetitive monopoly
openly. 1611 Compelling the state to engage in a conscious weighing
process would have the beneficial effect not only of protecting
-, .....,.u ...
·.,ual interests, but also of subjecting the states' choice to
political review, thereby ensuring a foundation for later judicial
Posner's suggestion is encouraging since it attempts to find
153. See Posner, supra note 81, at 699: "The Parker court opted for a narrow interpretation of the scope of the antitrust laws and broad deference to state regulation."
See Northwestern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Furst, Private Interest and Public Control: Government Action, The First
'"ntenc<men.t and the Sherman Act, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 9, 27.
For a discussion of the pressure for and bases of such regulation, see J. MORGAN,
J!A:ONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 18-22 (1976).
157. Posner, supra note 81, at 695-96.
158. ld. at 695.
159. ld. at 696.
160. Id. at 715.
161. ld.
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an approach which will take adequate account of the paramount
federal antitrust policies. However, like many of the traditional
tests developed by the courts, it is defective in its failure to examine the nature of the disputed local activity. Underlying Posner's
approach is the assumption that if a state meets all the technical
criteria-if the decisionmaker is independent and the state, consciously weighing the alternatives, explicitly authorizes the challenged activity-then a state policy warranting an exemption is
at stake and an exemption should be granted.
Two drawbacks to this approach are readily apparent. First,
it is just not clear that a legislature, pressured by powerful lobby
groups, will do a better job of balancing the competing interests
at stake than a court. Federal antitrust policy may be given short
shrift by state legislatures confronted with self-serving business
interests. Second, and perhaps more important, it is not clear
that a legislature, often pressed for time, will be able to consider
adequately each situtation in which a municipality seeks an exemption. Thus exemptions may be denied in many situations in
which they would be desirable simply because the municipality
cannot get the legislature to meet Posner's technical criteria.
Instead of trying to resolve the concerns inherent in Parher
by resorting to technical tests, a preferable approach would focus
on the nature and extent of the state and nationai interests at
stake. 162 Such an approach would shift the court's focus to a substantive analysis, and go beyond a consideration of only the
state's interests in determining if the state scheme should stand.
As one commentator has indicated, this balancing of anticompetitive effects against state interests "is not an altogether novel
ideal or one without some precedent." 163
Another approach which incorporates the type of balancing
required in the present situation is preemption analysis. Preemption is a judicially created doctrine 164 which is based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 16 " The first
162. See Slater, supra note 38, at 104; Note, A Preemption Analysis, supra note 40,
at 1164-65.
163. Slater, supra note 38, ;;t. 106. For cases involving the commerce clause in which
the Court has applied such a balancing test, see, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959}; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951}; Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945). See also Kennedy, supra note 67, at 73
(suggesting that the balancing approach should be applied not to the question of whether
the antitrust laws have been violated but to whether the antitrust Jaws apply at all}.
164. See Note, A Preemption Analysis, supra note 40, at 1167 (application of
preemption analysis to the state action exemption discussed}.
165. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
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step of a preemption analysis is to determine in what field a state
law operates and whether a federal law also operates in the same
field. The next step is to determine whether the federal law was
intended to exclusively occupy that field. 166 If the federal policy
is intended to be exclusive, the state statute falls. 167 If the federal
law or policy was not intended to be exclusive, the court must
look at the policy objectives of the national scheme and see
whether the state scheme stands as an obstacle. 168
The main thrust of the preemption analysis is to compel an
inquiry which goes beyond the statute toward an examination of
the underlying policies and the market characteristics of the disputed activity . 11i9 Under such an approach, the activities of a public utility would be upheld although they fostered admittedly
anticompetitive activity, because they nevertheless met other
goals of the antitrust laws-goals such as allocational efficiency,
the protection of consumers, or the preservation of small competitors. Although the facts of Lafayette do not present as clear a case
for exemption from the antitrust laws as the public utility situation, nevertheless the approach suggested is helpful in focusing
attention not only on the local interest in regulation but alsq on
the fundamental national policy of fostering free competition.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Lafayette case presented the Court with a novel question: the application of the state action doctrine to municipalities. In trying to resolve that issue the Court's plurality relied
exclusively on the legislative intent test. That test, like many of
the technical tests developed by courts in determining the scope
of the state action doctrine, does not provide a satisfactory answer
to the immunity claim. A better and more logical approach lies
in a test which focuses on the nature of the challenged activity
as defined in terms of a regulatory/proprietary distinction. There
is considerable support f0r drawing such a distinction in the muipality contextY0 This test has two additional advantages.
First, it provides justification for stricter scrutiny of exemptions
claimed by a local government acting in a proprietary capacity.
S,ince government proprietors seek not only to advance public
:,state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI.
166. Note, A Preemption Analysis, supra note 40, at 1170.
167. ld. at 1168. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
168. Note, A Preemption Analysis, supra note 40, at 1168.
169. ld. at 1172.
170. See text accompanying notes 131-32 surpa.
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interest but also to maximize profits, some restraint is necessary
to protect against anticompetitive effects. This test provides an
opportunity for such restraint. Moreover, the distinction gives
courts concerned about potential widespread noncompliance with
the antitrust laws a device for narrowing the scope of the state
action doctrine. As important as the distinction is, however, it
should not be wholly dispositive on the availability of an exemption. Not only is the distinction potentially difficult to apply but
it also focuses only on the nature of the conduct. The regulatory/proprietary approach should be supplemented by a balancing test which weighs the relative importance of state and local
interests with effective national antitrust enforcement. Such a
test would restrict th~ worst abuses of an overextension of the
state action exemption while at the saine time ensure that integral local functions are protected.
JuLIET
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KosTRITSKY

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-CIVIL RIGHTS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SCOPE OF IMMill~ITY AVAIL=
ABLE TO FEDERAL EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS-Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Following an audit, the Secretary
of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint, pursuant to
the Commodity Exchange Act, 1 against Arthur N. Economou. 2
The complaint alleged that Economou, while a registered futures
commission merchant, had willfully failed to maintain the minimum capital balance required of commodities traders under
Commodity Exchange Authority rules. 3 A recommendation sustaining the administrative complaint was filed by the Chief Hear1. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1970). Section 9 provides procedures to be employed against alleged
violators of the Commodity Exchange Act, id. §§1-17 (1970), and regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.60 (1978). The pertinent portions of§
9 provide:
If the Secretary of Agriculture has reason to believe that any person ... is
violating or has violated any of the provisions of this chapter or of the rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary of Agriculture or the commission thereunder, he may
serve upon such person a compiaint stating his charges in that respect, . . . requiring
such person to show cause . . . why the registration of such person, if registered as
futures commission merchant, . . . should not be suspended or revoked.
2. When the administrative complaint was issued on Feb. 19, 1970, Arthur N. Economou was president and controlling stockholder of Arthur N. Economou Co., an enterprise
established in 1955 to act as commodity broker, price analyst, and trading and investment
account manager in the field of commodities. From approximately 1960 until Dec. 3, 1970,
the organization was registered as commission merchants with the Commodity Exchange
Authority under the Commodity Exchange Act. Affidavit of Arthur N. Economou, sworn
to Feb. 3, 1972.

